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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jessica Jean Ibarra appeals from her judgment of conviction and from the district
court’s order awarding restitution.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Ibarra was a passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over for failure to stop at a stop
sign. (Tr. vol. II, p. 146, L. 23 – p. 147, L. 25; p. 150, L. 21 – p. 151, L. 11. 1) An officer
observed a gun in the back of the vehicle, removed Ibarra and the driver from the vehicle,
and searched Ibarra. (Tr. vol. II, p. 151, L. 15 – p. 155, L. 21.) Officers found marijuana
in Ibarra’s pocket and cocaine in a baggie in her sock. (Tr. vol. II, p. 155, L. 22 – p. 156,
L. 2; p. 167, L. 18 – p. 170, L. 11.)

The officers searched the car and found a

methamphetamine pipe on the passenger seat (Tr. vol. II, p. 221, L. 18 – p. 222, L. 8), and
a purse containing more paraphernalia (Tr. vol. II, p. 221, Ls. 18-22; p. 225, L. 1 – p. 226,
L. 21).
The officers questioned Ibarra and she indicated the items found in the car, other
than the gun, were “all hers, all for her personal use.” (Tr. vol. II, p. 166, Ls. 2-25.)
When asked “What about all the meth pipes?,” Ibarra affirmed they were hers. (State’s
Ex. 12, 00:12 – 00:40;

Tr. vol. II, p. 166, Ls. 9-13.)

Ibarra initially denied any

knowledge of the gun (Tr. vol. II, p. 166, Ls. 2-4), but, once she was told the driver,
Mariano, would be charged with unlawful possession of the firearm, Ibarra admitted the

1

This brief will use the convention set forth in the Appellant’s brief, denoting the motion
to suppress and sentencing hearing transcripts as “vol. I,” the transcripts from the first day
of trial as “vol. II,” and the transcripts from the second day of trial at “vol. III.”
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gun was hers. (Tr. vol. II, p. 182, Ls. 6-15.) The state charged Ibarra with possession of
cocaine, unlawful possession of a firearm, possession of marijuana, and possession of
paraphernalia. (R., pp. 7-10, 38-39, 147-48.)
The district court heard pretrial motions on the morning of trial. (Tr. vol. II, pp. 623.) The state brought up the pipe found in the car, noting that residue inside it tested
positive for methamphetamine, and that it “anticipat[ed] asking [the state lab expert] Ms.
Corrina Owsley about that.” (Tr. vol. II, p. 19, Ls. 6-20.) Ibarra objected based on I.R.E.
404(b) grounds:
MR. SISSON: Your Honor, first of all, my client is charged with
possession of cocaine, not possession of methamphetamine. The results of
the test from, I think, scraping one of the pipes, was that there was some
methamphetamine present, but I want to first of all emphasize that my
client isn’t charged with that crime.
THE COURT: Maybe we could just say there was illegal drugs found in
the pipe.
MR. SISSION: Well, Your Honor, the second thing is [sic] that my
understanding is that the State wants to use this for intent or knowledge or
lack of mistake. Those are 404(b) issues. That requires the State to provide
notice.
THE COURT: You mean the meth part?
MR. SISSION: Yes, the meth part.
So for them to provide written notice prior to court, unless there’s good
cause shown that they want to use this information as 404(b).
I haven’t received that. I was verbally informed of that this morning, but I
haven’t received a 404(b) notice of their intent to use that, so that puts us
at a disadvantage now, where we have to now defend against something
else.
(Tr. vol. II, p. 19, L. 25 – p. 20, L. 22.) Ibarra therefore requested that “we just don’t talk
about it.” (Tr. vol. II, p. 20, Ls. 24-25.)
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The state responded that the methamphetamine was not 404(b) evidence, but
evidence proving an element of the paraphernalia charge:
MS. FARLEY: Your Honor, the State does have to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that [Ibarra] did possess or did use paraphernalia with
intent to use a controlled substance. Methamphetamine is a controlled
substance.
Then it goes directly to the point that she did have the intention to use that
paraphernalia pipe for methamphetamine.
(Tr. vol. II, p. 21, Ls. 7-13.)
The district court ruled on Ibarra’s motion and determined it would not allow the
officer to say, “‘We tested it, and it was meth in it’”; however, the court ruled that “[h]e
can say, ‘We tested it, and it contained an illegal controlled substance,’ and leave it at
that.” (Tr. vol. II, p. 22, Ls. 20-24.)
The state called the arresting officer as a witness. (Tr. vol. II, pp. 142-216.)
During direct examination, the prosecutor asked the officer whether, “[b]ased on your
training and experience, you believed [the defendant and the driver] were both guilty of
this?” (Tr. vol. II, p. 183, Ls. 21-22.) Ibarra objected, and the objection was sustained
before the officer could answer the question. (Tr. vol. II, p. 183, Ls. 23-24.)
On redirect, the prosecutor asked the officer, “[i]f you believed someone was
innocent, would you arrest them,” and, “if you believed Jessica [Ibarra] did not know
about the gun and did not have access to it, would you have arrested her?” (Tr. vol. II, p.
214, L. 11 – p. 215, L. 19.) Ibarra did not object to these questions or move for a mistrial
based on them. (See
- - Tr. vol. II, pp. 214-15.)
The jury found Ibarra guilty of possession of cocaine, unlawful possession of a
firearm, possession of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia, and, pursuant to an
3

information part 2, a prior-felony enhancement. (Tr. vol. III, p. 151, L. 13 – p. 157, L. 8.)
Ibarra was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment with six-and-a-half years fixed for the
cocaine charge, followed by a consecutive five-year sentence, with zero years fixed, for
the firearm charge. (Tr. vol. I, p. 120, Ls. 10-25.) Ibarra was also sentenced to two
concurrent 180-day sentences for the two misdemeanor charges. (Tr. vol. I, p. 121, Ls.
17-23.)
At sentencing, the state requested restitution for costs of prosecution, and later
submitted a statement in support of those costs. (Tr. vol. I, p. 124, L. 8 – p. 125, L. 21;
R., pp. 77-88.) Ibarra never objected to the restitution order, challenged it, or requested a
hearing on it. (See Tr. vol. I, pp. 124-25; see generally, R.)
Ibarra timely appealed from the judgments of conviction. (R., pp. 75, 83-84, 8993, 339-45.)

4

ISSUES
Ibarra states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting opinion
testimony about Ms. Ibarra’s guilt in regard to the firearm charge.

II.

Whether the district court erred by admitting propensity evidence when the
State failed to provide the written notice required under I.R.E. 404(b).

III.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering restitution
which was solely based on the prosecutor’s unsworn statement, not on
sufficient evidence.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
I.

Has Ibarra failed to show the prosecutor’s questions constituted fundamental error?

II.

Because generic references to the pipe containing “an illegal controlled substance” prove
an element of the paraphernalia charge, has Ibarra failed to show the district court erred
by not requiring written notice to admit the evidence?

III.

By failing to challenge the restitution order below has Ibarra waived her argument
challenging it for the first time on appeal?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Ibarra Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor’s Questions On Redirect Constitute
Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
During direct examination, the prosecutor asked the arresting officer whether,

“[b]ased on your training and experience, you believed [the defendant and the driver]
were both guilty of this?” (Tr. vol. II, p. 183, Ls. 21-24.) Prior to any answer being
given, Ibarra objected to this question, and the district court sustained the objection. (Tr.,
vol. II, p. 183, Ls. 23-24.)
On cross examination, Ibarra’s counsel asked the officer whether he had “any
reason to believe [Ibarra] was lying about meth pipes or bongs or paraphernalia.” (Tr.,
vol. II, p. 196, L. 25 – p. 197, L. 3.) Ibarra’s counsel also inquired about the conversation
between Ibarra and the officer, which was recorded and previously published to the jury:
Q. [from defense counsel] Okay.
So I don’t get it. I mean, she is admitting to the gun. Why are you so
adamant about “taking the beef for him” and, you know, “absolutely not”?
I think another one was, “Good luck. I hope you wise up and decide not to
take the heat for him.”
What do you care if she’s doing that?
A. [from Officer Duke] Like I said, I do not believe Mariano [the driver]
was totally innocent.
And the fact that he got away with all of the drugs that were located, and—
that’s my point.
Q. Okay. So your point isn’t that you are skeptical about whether she
actually knew the gun was there or not. You are just saying she is taking
all of the heat for him?
6

A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Why didn’t you say that? Why didn’t you just say, “Look,
Jessica. I know you knew the gun was there, but why aren’t you saying?
Why aren’t you being honest and telling us that Mariano also knew the
gun was there”?
Why didn’t you just say that? I mean, that’s pretty easy; right?
Yes or no?
A. Yeah, I could have. Yeah. Absolutely.
Q. I mean, your goal here, according to your testimony, is to get her to
admit he knew the gun was there as well; right?
A. Yeah.
Q. So why are you taking the stand of, “I don’t believe you”?
Well of course I guess that’s not what you are saying. You are just trying
to say, “Don’t take the heat for him.”
But you are not actually asking her, “Look, come clean with us, tell us the
truth. Tell us that it’s Mariano’s gun.”
A. I’m pretty sure the conversation may have started that way, and then it
eventually led to the end conversation where her and I were basically
screaming at each other.
Q. Uh-huh. Uh-huh.
(Tr., vol. II, p. 211, L. 2 – p. 212, L. 18.)
On redirect, the prosecutor asked the following questions:
Q. [from the prosecutor] So you didn’t seek out on your own this vehicle
driven by the defendant [sic] and pull it over?
A. [from Officer Duke] No.
Q. When you submit items to be fingerprinted, is there a record of that?
A. Yes.
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Q. And are you aware of how a firearm is fingerprinted?
A. No.
Q. And as part of your job, is it to arrest innocent people?
A. No.
Q. If you believed someone was innocent, would you arrest them?
A. No.
Q. So counsel had a conversation with you about your interaction with Ms.
Ibarra, and you indicated that you didn’t think Mr. [Mariano] Castillo was
completely innocent—
A. Correct.
Q. –so you were using interview tactics to try to gain some further
information?
A. Yes.
Q. And counsel suggested some ways maybe you could have interviewed,
asking nicely basically?
A. Yes.
Q. And would you agree with me in State’s Exhibit No. 12, when you
asked, “Okay. Whose gun is it? Is it Mariano’s?”
Is that a nice way to ask whose gun it was?
A. I thought I was being nice.
Q. And you described when we first talked today that sometimes you try to
talk on a level to gain respect.
Is that what you eventually attempted to do, is speak to Jessica how she
was speaking to you?
A. More or less; yes.
Q. Mimicking the language she was speaking with you?

8

A. Correct.
Q. And if you believed Jessica did not know about the gun and did not
have access to it, would you have arrested her?
A. No.
(Tr. vol. II, p. 214, L. 2 – p. 215, L. 19 (emphasis added).)
Ibarra argues that the two questions highlighted above, asked during redirect
examination, constitute fundamental error. (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 2 However, Ibarra
fails to show the first question was improper, insofar as she fails to show it was referring
to Ibarra, and not the driver of the car. Regarding the second question, defense counsel
repeatedly cast doubt on the officer’s beliefs that Ibarra actually possessed the gun;
insofar as counsel opened the door to this line of inquiry, it was proper for the state to
clarify what the officer believed.
Even if error, the questions on redirect did not rise to the level of fundamental
error because Ibarra fails to show a clearly violated constitutional right, plain on the
record, that was not harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho’s courts review claims of prosecutorial misconduct “not preserved on

appeal through an objection at trial” for fundamental error. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho
132, 141, 334 P.3d 806, 815 (2014).

2

The question asked on direct—“[b]ased on your training and experience, you believed
[the defendant and the driver] were both guilty of this?”, was objected to, and the
objection was properly sustained. (Tr. vol. II, p. 183, Ls. 21-24.)
9

C.

Ibarra Fails To Show A Violation Of A Constitutional Right, Clear On The
Record, That Was Not Harmless; Thus, She Fails To Show That The Prosecutor’s
Statements Rose To The Level Of Fundamental Error
For the first time on appeal, Ibarra claims the prosecutor committed misconduct

that deprived her of a fair trial by improperly eliciting the officer’s opinion about her guilt
during redirect examination. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-10.) Because she did not preserve
this claim with an objection below she is required to show fundamental error on appeal.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). To establish fundamental
error,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
Ibarra has failed to show the prosecutor’s questions on redirect constituted error,
much less fundamental error entitling her to review of this unpreserved claim.
1.

Ibarra Fails To Show The Questions Asked On Redirect Were Error, As
She Fails To Show The First Question Pertained To Ibarra, And She Fails
To Show The Second Question Was Not A Proper Response To Defense
Counsel’s Questions On Cross-Examination

Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence 702 and 704, expert opinion testimony “that
concerns conclusions or opinions that the average juror is qualified to draw from the facts
utilizing the juror’s common sense and normal experience is inadmissible.” State v.
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 66, 253 P.3d 727, 740 (2011); I.R.E. 702, 704. Questions such
as these are objectionable not because they address the ultimate issue, but because they
concern conclusions and “inference[s] that could be drawn by the jurors utilizing their
10

own common sense and normal experience.” See id. (quoting State v. Parks, 71 Or. App.
630, 693 P.2d 657, 659–60 (1985) (noting a question to an expert “was the defendant
negligent?” would be objectionable, “not because it’s the ultimate issue to be determined
by the jury, but because the witness is not better able to reach a conclusion on that
issue”)); see also State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 633, 38 P.3d 1285, 1289 (Ct. App.
2001). Applying this standard, the Ellington Court examined an accident-reconstruction
expert’s testimony on whether the defendant acted intentionally. 151 Idaho at 65-67, 253
P.3d at 739-41. The Ellington Court concluded that expert testimony “that there was ‘not
an accident’ was clearly inadmissible opinion testimony on Mr. Ellington’s state of mind
that was not helpful to the jury.” Id. at 67, 253 P.3d at 741. Similarly, “a lay or expert
witness cannot give an opinion of another witness’s credibility or encroach on the factfinding functions of the jury.” Parker, 157 Idaho at 148-49, 334 P.3d at 822-23.
As a threshold matter, Ibarra has failed to show that the prosecutor’s first question
was an error, because Ibarra fails to show the inquiry about arresting “someone” was a
reference to her, and not Mariano Castillo, the driver of the car. The complete exchange
was as follows:
Q. If you believed someone was innocent, would you arrest them?
A. No.
Q. So counsel had a conversation with you about your interaction with Ms.
Ibarra, and you indicated that you didn’t think Mr. Castillo was completely
innocent—
A. Correct.
Q. –so you were using interview tactics to try to gain some further
information?

11

A. Yes.
(Tr. vol. II, p. 214, Ls. 14-23.) Placed in context, the “someone” in the prosecutor’s
hypothetical was not Ibarra, but was Mariano, and the question sought to clarify the
officer’s intent to elicit information about Mariano—an issue the defense had mentioned
in cross-examination. (See Tr. vol. II, p. 212, Ls. 2-5.)
Moreover, Ibarra has failed to show that questions about another individual’s guilt
or innocence would be prohibited by the rules of evidence. Admittedly, per Parker, a lay
witness may not opine about another witness’s credibility or “encroach on the fact-finding
functions of the jury.” Parker, 157 Idaho at 148-49, 334 P.3d at 822-23. It was therefore
nonreversible error, in that case, “to comment on Parker’s truthfulness or guilt.” Id.
But Parker does not indicate this prohibition also applies to comments on other
persons’ guilt. See id. And Mariano was not on trial here, Ibarra was. Mariano’s guilt or
innocence was not a province reserved for the jury, nor was this statement an opinion
about Mariano’s truthfulness. The officer simply explained his interview tactics, which
were driven by a belief about Mariano’s guilt, and which the prosecutor brought up in
response to a point addressed on cross-examination. Ibarra fails to show this was an
error.
As for the prosecutor’s second question, regarding the officer’s beliefs about
Ibarra’s knowledge of the gun, defense counsel directly opened the door to this line of
questioning. Here, defense counsel’s strategy was to create doubt about the officer’s
beliefs, based on the officer’s statements that Ibarra was trying to “take the heat for”
Mariano (see State’s Ex. 20):

12

Q. So I don’t get it. I mean, she is admitting to the gun. Why are you so
adamant about “taking the beef for him” and, you know, “absolutely
not”?
I think another one was, “Good luck. I hope you wise up and decide not to
take the heat for him.”
What do you care if she’s doing that?
A. [from Officer Duke] Like I said, I do not believe Mariano was totally
innocent.
And the fact that he got away with all of the drugs that were located, and—
that’s my point.
Q. Okay. So your point isn’t that you are skeptical about whether she
actually knew the gun was there or not. You are just saying she is taking
all of the heat for him?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Why didn’t you say that? Why didn’t you just say, “Look,
Jessica. I know you knew the gun was there, but why aren’t you saying?
Why aren’t you being honest and telling us that Mariano also knew the
gun was there”?
Why didn’t you just say that? I mean, that’s pretty easy; right?
Yes or no?
A. Yeah, I could have. Yeah. Absolutely.
Q. I mean, your goal here, according to your testimony, is to get her to
admit he knew the gun was there as well; right?
A. Yeah.
Q. So why are you taking the stand of, “I don’t believe you”?
Well of course I guess that’s not what you are saying. You are just trying
to say, “Don’t take the heat for him.”
But you are not actually asking her, “Look, come clean with us, tell us the
truth. Tell us that it’s Mariano’s gun.”

13

(Tr., vol. II, p. 211, L. 2 – p. 212, L. 13.)
Defense counsel’s sotto voce theme here is unmistakable: why did the officer
accuse Ibarra of “taking the beef” for Mariano if the officer believed her admissions about
possessing the gun? And if the officer did believe her admissions, why did he not “just
say that”? By asking these questions, repeatedly, defense counsel clearly intended to
show that the officer did not believe Ibarra’s admissions.
And if there was any doubt this was the intended implication, defense counsel
himself affirmed this is what he meant, by explicitly making this argument in closing:
And then [Officer Duke] says, “Good luck.” This is towards the end of the
interview. I hope you wise up and decide not to take the heat for him.
Once again, that’s kind of a farewell, parting shot, so to speak. She goes,
“I ain’t taking the heat for no one.” And then her voice kind of trails off.
I’m not sure what she says. You can listen to it. And then he goes,
“Really?” Once again. Our skeptic here.
Okay. Why is Officer Duke reacting to Jessica that way? You would think
he would be pretty happy. I’ve got someone who’s confessed to a crime.
My job is easy now, right? She’s confessed. Easy. And this subject was
broached, I think, by—I think somewhere along in this trial. And let me
ask you this. Did you get a good explanation of these comments? So he—
at the time, I guess he supposedly believed that she possessed the gun and
he possessed the gun at the same time. Is that—was that what’s going on
here or what is the answer to that question? Okay? Or was this some kind
of elaborate interrogation technique? You know, I kind of harass, or I act
like I don’t believe, or I say something one way and it’s going to somehow
get everybody else to confess to it another way? I’m not really sure.
That’s the point. Are you sure? Are you sure why he said that? Or maybe
the real answer is he said what he said because he really didn’t believe
Jessica possessed the gun. He had his doubts. He knew what was going on
that evening. He knew that the girlfriend was taking the fall for the
boyfriend.
(Tr. vol. III, p. 129, L. 7 – p. 130, L. 15 (emphasis added).) Defense counsel could not
have stated it more plainly; per defense counsel, the officer “really didn’t believe Jessica
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possessed the gun,” and counsel’s questions on cross-examination were no doubt
intended to support this theory by calling the officer’s beliefs and motivations into
question.
Defense counsel’s questions on cross-examination opened the door for the
prosecutor to counter this line of attack and clarify what the officer actually believed. See
e.g., State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 399 P.3d 804, 825 (2017) (quoting United States
v. Dorsey, 677 F.3d 944, 954 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Having opened the door to the subject of
the veracity of the State’s witnesses, the defense ‘should not be surprised to see the
prosecutor enter.’”)). While questions regarding an officer’s beliefs about the defendant’s
guilt would usually be improper, in this case, under these facts, they were not. Because
defense counsel raised the issue of the officer’s beliefs about Ibarra’s culpability, the
prosecutor properly clarified what the officer believed. Placed in the context of this case,
the prosecutor’s questions were not error.
2.

Even If Error, Ibarra Fails To Show That Questions To The Officer On
Redirect Would Be A Violation Of An Unwaived Constitutional Right

Even if the questions posed on redirect were error, Ibarra fails to show
fundamental error. First, to meet Perry’s first prong, Ibarra must show a violation of a
constitutional right. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. And in Parker, the Idaho
Supreme Court has made clear that eliciting inadmissible testimony of an “opinion of
Parker’s truthfulness or guilt” is simply an evidentiary error—and not a constitutional
violation—and therefore “does not satisfy the threshold analysis under the fundamental
error standard.” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 148-49, 334 P.3d 806, 822-23 (2014).
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The Parker court reviewed the state’s direct examination of a detective who
testified about “the physical and verbal cues that he observes during interviews” of
suspects. Id. at 148, 334 P.3d at 822. The detective “testified that it was a cue to him that
Parker did not deny the allegations of inappropriate contact” with the victim,” “[b]ecause
in [the detective’s] training and experience, someone that—most people, when they are
accused of something they didn’t do, will deny it.” Id. When asked about why he
deployed certain themes in interviews, the detective testified, “I take it that [defendant] is
lying about the incident that the victim has alleged,” and thus the officer’s goal was “to
minimize it so that later [the defendant] will come out with the truth.” Id.
The Parker Court found no fundamental error, because Parker did not demonstrate
an unwaived constitutional right was plainly violated:
“[I]n Idaho a trial error that does not violate one or more of the
defendant’s constitutionally protected rights is not subject to reversal
under the fundamental error doctrine.” [Perry, 150 Idaho] at 226, 245 P.3d
at 978. In other words, the fundamental error doctrine is not triggered by a
violation of a rule or statute. Id. A defendant’s constitutional right to a fair
trial is not categorically violated by an evidentiary error. This Court has
repeatedly recognized that a lay or expert witness cannot give an opinion
of another witness’s credibility or encroach on the fact-finding functions
of the jury, but that rule is based on the Idaho Rules of Evidence, not a
constitutional provision.
Id. at 148-49, 334 P.3d at 822-23 (emphasis added). “Thus,” the court concluded, “even
assuming that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting inadmissible opinion
testimony, Parker has failed to show a clear violation of a constitutional right,” and
“failed to satisfy the threshold analysis under the fundamental error standard.” Id. at 149,
334 P.3d at 823.
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That same standard applies here. Ibarra’s claim, at root, is based on the rules of
evidence and alleges an evidentiary error. She claims the officer’s opinion testimony did
“not speak to a matter that is beyond the common sense, experience, and education of the
average juror, and so, such opinions do not ‘assist’ the jury in fulfilling its duties.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) This is simply a paraphrase of I.R.E. 702. Moreover, the cases
Ibarra cites in support of her claim—Hester and Ellington—were specifically examining
the propriety of eliciting opinions per I.R.E. 702 and 704. See State v. Hester, 114 Idaho
688, 692-96, 760 P.2d 27, 31-35 (1988); Ellington, 151 Idaho at 66-67, 253 P.3d at 74041.

Thus, while packaged on appeal as a due process violation, at root this is an

evidentiary claim, based on the rules of evidence. And the Parker Court has already
found that while “a lay or expert witness cannot give an opinion of another witness’s
credibility or encroach on the fact-finding functions of the jury, … that rule is based on
the Idaho Rules of Evidence, not a constitutional provision.” 157 Idaho at 148–49, 334
P.3d at 822–23.
Ibarra, like Parker, presents a claim of evidentiary error. Per Perry’s first prong,
she therefore cannot show a clear violation of a constitutional right, and cannot meet the
threshold of showing fundamental error.

3.

Even If The Questions To The Officer Would Be A Violation Of An
Unwaived Constitutional Right, Ibarra Fails To Show Such An Error Is
Clear And Obvious From The Record

Alternatively, even assuming Ibarra can show a violation of an unwaived
constitutional right, she fails to meet Perry’s second prong, because she fails to show a
violation that is clear and obvious from the record. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d
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at 980. An appellant alleging fundamental error has the burden under Perry’s second
prong to show that the error was “clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Here, Ibarra fails to meet that burden. Her attorney’s choice to object to the first
question—but not the second and third questions—may have been tactical. By objecting
to some, but not all of the questions at issue, an attorney demonstrates at the very least
that he or she “likely was not ignorant of the law or unaware of the evidence the
prosecutor attempted to introduce.” Parker, 157 Idaho at 145, 334 P.3d at 819. That was
precisely the case in Parker, where trial counsel raised hearsay objections and received
rulings on some elicited statements, but later opted not to object or move for a mistrial for
similar statements. Id. at 142-46, 334 P.3d at 815-20. The Parker Court inferred from the
earlier objections that counsel “likely was not ignorant of the law”; as a result, Parker
could not show the later failures to object were not purposeful, tactical choices. Id. at
145-46, 334 P.3d 819-20. Likewise, because Ibarra objected to one of the statements, but
not the other two, she cannot show the failures to object were not tactical.
Ibarra concludes that 1) “the transcript is eminently clear as to what questions the
prosecutor asked of Officer Duke”; 2) those questions were also “clearly” improper; and
3) “[t]herefore, the error is clear from the record.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) However,
this syllogism fails to address whether the failures to object were tactical choices.
Because the failures to object may well have been tactical, and because it is not clear
from the record whether they were, Ibarra fails to meet Perry’s second prong and fails to
show fundamental error.
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4.

Even If Ibarra Has Shown A Clear And Obvious Violation Of An
Unwaived Constitutional Right, Any Error Was Harmless

Per Perry’s final prong, even assuming clear and obvious error that violated a
constitutional right, the defendant has the burden of showing “a reasonable possibility
that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 444,
348 P.3d 1, 59 (2015) (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978).
Ibarra has failed to show fundamental error, because, even assuming a clear and
obvious violation of a constitutional right, the error would have been harmless. This was
a strong case, and there was ample evidence—including the defendant’s own taped,
unobjected-to admissions that the items in the car were hers—supporting the jury verdict.
(Tr. vol. II, p. 166, L. 2 – p. 167, L. 13; p. 182, L. 6 – p. 183, L. 6; State’s Ex. 12, State’s
Ex. 19.)
Moreover, there was no reasonable possibility that hearing the arresting officer’s
opinion about Ibarra’s culpability had any effect on this trial. The authorities Ibarra cites,
while reversals, examine different legal questions and weaker evidentiary cases. See
United States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding plain error where the
jury was not instructed on an officer’s dual role as lay- and expert-witness; where the
state failed to establish a foundation under federal evidentiary rules; where the state
admitted plainly erroneous drug quantity testimony; and where the jury verdict depended
on that quantity testimony); United States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 590, 596-600 (6th Cir.
2013) (where the government conceded that the FBI agent “lacked the first-hand
knowledge required to lay a sufficient foundation for his testimony under [federal] Rule
701(a),” and where the court concluded the agent’s testimony could not have been
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admitted as expert testimony, despite the agent’s references “to his expertise and
credentials, giving him an aura of authority on the stand”); United States v. Hampton, 718
F.3d 978, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (where “the government’s evidence consisted largely of
wiretap interceptions” and recordings interpreted by the officer in question, and where the
only other major source of evidence was a witness whom the “jury had reasons to doubt,”
and “discount her testimony”); United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 751-52 (2nd Cir.
2004) (where the other evidence against the defendant was “thin” and “weak,” such that
the jury was initially hung, and only arrived at a verdict after receiving an Allen 3 charge);
State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 859, 810 P.2d 1138, 1145 (Ct. App. 1991) (where the
court erred in admitting a vouching opinion and “[t]he credibility of the state’s witnesses
was a primary issue in the case”).
Here, the state presented ample evidence to prove its case. Ibarra fails to show a
reasonable possibility that hearing the officer’s opinion about her culpability had any
effect on the verdict, and therefore, she fails to show the error was not harmless.

II.
Because References To The Pipe Containing “An Illegal Controlled Substance” Prove An
Element Of The Paraphernalia Charge, Ibarra Fails To Show Written Notice Was
Required To Introduce This Evidence; Alternatively, If Notice Was Required, Any Error
Was Harmless
A.

Introduction
Ibarra claims her convictions should be vacated because the state’s lab expert

testified that the pipe contained “an illegal controlled substance.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.
10-12.)

3

Ibarra claims that “[t]hat generic reference … presents evidence of other

Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
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uncharged conduct, namely, possession of a controlled substance.” (Appellant’s brief, p.
12.) Therefore, she argues, per I.R.E. 404(b), “that generic reference is … inadmissible
because the prosecutor did not provide the required written notice of her intent to present
testimony about that other, uncharged act.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)
This argument fails, because evidence showing the pipe contained an illegal
controlled substance is evidence of the paraphernalia violation; not evidence of “other”
uncharged conduct prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b). Alternatively, even if the evidence falls
under I.R.E. 404(b), the failure to provide written notice was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
Courts employ a two-tiered analysis to determine the admissibility of evidence of

other crimes or misconduct. State v. Williams, 134 Idaho 590, 592, 6 P.3d 840, 842 (Ct.
App. 2000). “First, the trial court must determine whether the evidence is relevant and, if
so, the court must then determine whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. (citing State v. Cochran,
129 Idaho 944, 948, 935 P.2d 207, 211 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973,
974, 712 P.2d 674, 675 (Ct. App. 1985)). On appeal, this Court “exercise[s] free review
of the trial court’s determination of relevancy,” but reviews for abuse of discretion “when
considering the trial court’s balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the
danger of unfair prejudice.” Williams, 134 Idaho at 592, 6 P.3d at 842.

21

C.

Generic References To “An Illegal Controlled Substance” Do Not Refer To A
Prior Bad Act To Be Analyzed Under I.R.E. 404(b), But Rather, Are Proof Of An
Element Of The Paraphernalia Charge
Pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in
conformity therewith.” However, such evidence may “be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file
and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.” I.R.E. 404(b).
The Idaho Code provides “[i]t is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body
a controlled substance.” I.C. § 37-2734A.
Here, in ruling on Ibarra’s pretrial I.R.E. 404(b) objection to the state lab expert
testifying about the meth pipe, the district court disallowed any specific reference to
methamphetamine, but allowed the expert to testify the pipe contained “an illegal
controlled substance.” (Tr. vol. II, p. 22, L. 20 – p. 23, L. 5.) When asked by the
prosecutor whether a test of the pipe showed “positive for an illegal controlled
substance,” the expert accordingly testified that “[i]t did.” (Tr. vol. III, p. 60, Ls. 16-24.)
It is accordingly a threshold question on appeal whether the generic reference to
“an illegal controlled substance” was evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts,” such
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that I.R.E. 404(b), and its written notice requirements, applied. See State v. Sheldon, 145
Idaho 225, 228, 178 P.3d 28, 31 (2008) (asking first, as a threshold matter, whether “the
nearly $7,000 found in [defendant’s] vehicle” even qualified as “other acts” evidence,
such that a 404(b) analysis was required).
It is unclear from the record whether the district court determined that a generic
reference to “an illegal controlled substance” would be evidence of “other crimes,
wrongs, or acts.” (See Tr. vol. II, p. 22, L. 20 – p. 23, L. 5.) However, the state argued
that the revelation of the test result would be proof of an element of the paraphernalia
charge:
Your Honor, the State does have to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
she did possess or did use paraphernalia with intent to use a controlled
substance. Methamphetamine is a controlled substance.
(Tr. vol. II, p. 21, Ls. 7-10 (emphasis added).)
This was correct. In the context of this case, evidence that the pipe contained a
controlled substance is not “uncharged conduct”—it is an element of the charged crime
of possession of paraphernalia, which prohibits possession “with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to … store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce
into the human body a controlled substance.” I.C. § 37-2734A (emphasis added); see
also State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 14, 696 P.2d 856, 865 (1985) (interpreting I.C. § 372734B and holding “[t]he crucial decision under the Act, though, and what makes an item
‘drug paraphernalia’ for purposes of the Act, is whether the defendant intended that it be
used with illegal drugs. We think it rare, indeed, that a defendant will ever be able to
rebut the assertion that the item in question is, in fact, capable of being used as drug
paraphernalia. But the defendant need not do so. Rather, with respect to I.C. § 37–
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2701(bb), what the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant
used an item with an illegal drug….) (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
Ibarra argues that “the generic reference is still inadmissible because the
prosecutor did not provide the required written notice of her intent to present testimony
about that other, uncharged act.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12 (emphasis added).) But
without a reference to a specific controlled substance, or some prior incident of use, there
was no “other, uncharged” act to speak of: the expert simply testified that the pipe tested
positive for an illegal controlled substance, which was an element of the charged act of
possessing paraphernalia.

See I.C. § 37-2734A.

A cryptic reference to “an illegal

controlled substance” would not, on its own, be evidence of an uncharged crime, insofar
as the state could not charge an individual with possessing a schedule-less, unnamed
controlled substance. See I.C. § 37-2701, et seq.
And while use of an unnamed “illegal controlled substance” could conceivably
qualify as a prior bad act, it would not function that way here, where Ibarra was charged
with present possession of paraphernalia used to contain a controlled substance. By
definition, testimony that the paraphernalia tested positive for an “illegal controlled
substance” was purely evidence of that paraphernalia possession—which was neither
uncharged, nor a prior bad act, and therefore outside the scope of I.R.E. 404(b).
Because this was not evidence of “an uncharged act” it is not subject to 404(b) as
a threshold matter, and the state was not required to serve written notice prior to its use.
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D.

Even If The Evidence Should Be Analyzed Under 404(b), Any Error In Admitting
The Evidence Without Notice Was Harmless
Alternatively, even if the reference to the test result was I.R.E. 404(b) evidence,

Ibarra does not claim the district court erred when it applied a 404(b) balancing test. (See
Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) Instead, Ibarra claims the district court erred by allowing the
generic testimony “in absence of the proper notice.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) Based
solely on this notice claim, Ibarra argues her convictions should be vacated. (Appellant’s
brief, p. 12.)
But failure to give 404(b) notice does not automatically require that the
convictions be vacated. Rather, this Court applies a harmless error standard to determine
the consequence of failing to provide 404(b) notice. See, e.g., Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 23031, 178 P.3d at 33-34 (finding “the admission of evidence was not harmless error”
because defendant’s prior statements “regarding his past dealings in methamphetamine”
were “highly prejudicial” and of “low” probative value, and because the fact that
“Sheldon dealt smaller amounts of methamphetamine in the past does not lead to the
conclusion he knew there was a pound of the substance under his car seat.”). To find
harmless error a reviewing court must “declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the
conviction.” Id. (quoting Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 156, 177 P.3d 362, 371
(2008)).
Here, any failure to provide 404(b) notice, and ensuing admission of the test result
evidence, was harmless. The jury had already heard that law enforcement found a pipe
“that’s commonly used for methamphetamine” sticking out of the passenger seat where

25

Ibarra had been sitting, to which Ibarra had no objection. (Tr. vol. II, p. 221, L. 18 – p.
222, L. 8.) The jury heard testimony that Ibarra admitted items found in the car were “all
hers, all for her personal use” to which Ibarra had no objection. (See Tr. vol. II, p. 166,
Ls. 5-8.) The jury heard Ibarra herself on video, specifically admit to possessing the
“meth pipes”:
Officer Duke: What about the uh, marijuana bong that was under your
seat?
Ibarra: That’s mine.
Officer Duke: That’s yours, too? Okay. What about all the meth pipes?
Ibarra: Mine.
(State’s Ex. 12, 00:03 – 00:40 (emphasis added).) This videotaped confession was
admitted into evidence without objection. (See Tr. vol. II, p. 167, Ls. 10-14.)
Given the plethora of admitted evidence that Ibarra possessed a meth pipe, further
revelations that the meth pipe contained “an unnamed controlled substance,” would not
have affected the jury verdict. 4

Unlike the highly prejudicial, minimally probative

statements in Sheldon, which did not bear on the charged elements of the crime, a test
result confirming Ibarra’s own admissions, regarding an element of a charged crime,
would have been highly probative and not unfairly prejudicial. Even assuming the test
result was 404(b) evidence, the failure to give notice and admission of the evidence was
harmless.

4

Ibarra’s own taped admissions were arguably more damaging than the generic test
result, given she verified the pipe was used for meth. (State’s Ex. 12, 00:03 – 00:40.)
The test result, on the other hand, simply confirmed the pipe contained an unnamed
controlled substance—which for all the jury knew, could have been meth, or could have
been codeine. See I.C. §§ 37-2707(d)(3), 37-2713(c)(1).
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III.
Ibarra Failed To Challenge The Restitution Order Below, And Therefore Has Waived
Challenging It For The First Time On Appeal
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Ibarra claims the restitution order is void because it

does not comport with State v. Nelson, 161 Idaho 692, 390 P.3d 418 (2017), and State v.
Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 390 P.3d 424 (2017). Specifically, Ibarra now contends that
the restitution order was not supported by sufficient evidence. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 1416.)
However, Ibarra never objected to the restitution order below, much less presented
a claim that it was unsupported by sufficient evidence. She has therefore invited any
error and has waived any challenge to the restitution order on appeal. Alternatively,
should this Court grant relief on this claim, the proper remedy would be a remand to
recalculate the restitution amount.

B.

Standard Of Review
An award of “restitution under section 37-2732(k) is discretionary.” Nelson, 161

Idaho at 695, 390 P.3d at 421. In determining whether the district court abused its
discretion, this Court examines “whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with relevant legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of
reason.” Id.
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C.

Ibarra Never Objected To The Restitution Order Below And Therefore Has
Waived Her Challenge To It On Appeal
“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the

parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.”
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (citing
Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, By & Through Dep’t of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799–
800, 589 P.2d 540, 546–47 (1979); Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 119, 124 P.3d
993, 995 (2005); Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 82, 437 P.2d 32, 35 (1968)) (“We have
held generally that this court will not review issues not presented in the trial court, and
that parties will be held to the theory on which the cause was tried.”). Similarly, where a
party “complain[s] of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in,” this Court “will not
reverse.” State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985) (citing State v.
Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 673 P.2d 436 (1983)). “In other words, invited errors are not
reversible.” Id.
A review of the sentencing hearing shows that Ibarra was apprised of her right to
object to the state’s proposed restitution order:
THE COURT: Okay. Now, Ms. Farley, you apparently have a proposed
order for restitution and judgment for the court’s signature, but I don’t
think there’s the—did you file the affidavit?
MS. FARLEY: I believe I did. I do have hard copies, if you would like to
see those. I don’t know what the process is for filing them out here, but I
do have them. And I—
THE COURT: Well, there’s an—there’s an affidavit—did you have an
affidavit that you filed?
MS. FARLEY: I believe it was filed. There’s my affidavit that I have
signed and the affidavit for restitution from the Idaho State Police lab as
well, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: Okay. And do you know when they were filed?
MS. FARLEY: This fax for the order is on January 27 of 2017. I—it
should have been attached with those documents.
THE COURT: January 27.
MS. FARLEY: And it looks like we faxed that in.
THE COURT: Okay. Is it in the ROA?
THE CLERK: I’ll look. No.
MS. FARLEY: And I can have those resubmitted after today, too, as well.
THE COURT: Yeah, I’m just not seeing them.
And—and again, you know, and I apologize to everybody who’s been
waiting. This case was set on my calendar by somebody else, and it was
set for a half hour. And this—it’s unfortunate but, of course, it’s
important, and it needed to take the time that was required.
And so I’m going to—I’ll just have to look and see if it was filed.
Otherwise—
MS. FARLEY: I will refile it.
THE COURT: —then you will need to file it. So that—
Because I want to make a record that also, Ms. Ibarra, you have a right to
object to any request for restitution, either if it’s beyond the scope of
what’s allowed or—by law or the amounts don’t look right. So I want to
make sure that the process has been filed—I mean, followed so that the
issue can be addressed.
(See Tr. vol. I, p. 124, L. 8 – p. 125, L. 21.) However, a review of the record shows
Ibarra never objected to or challenged the restitution that was ultimately ordered. (See
generally R.)
The newfound error Ibarra complains of was therefore invited by her, insofar as
she never challenged the state’s evidence supporting the restitution order. Accordingly,
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any failure of the district court to sua sponte convene a restitution hearing, or refuse to
consider an unobjected-to statement supporting the restitution order, was a consented-to
error. Likewise, newly posed legal theories, such as Ibarra’s claim that “the drug charges
were consolidated with the firearm charge, and the applicable statute does not authorize
the district court to award restitution for the time spent on the firearm charge”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 14), have likewise been waived. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at
___, 396 P.3d at 704. Because Ibarra invited any errors, and waited until this appeal to
raise these issues, she has failed to preserve her claim on appeal. See, e.g., State v.
Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2010) (where defendant’s
claim that the district court erred by using county calculations for hourly rates of pay,
including “allotted fringe benefits,” contrary to the statutory definition of “regular salaries
of employees” was not preserved, because defendant “did not challenge the propriety of
the state’s calculation of the officers’ hourly pay rates at any of the hearings in this case.
This Court will not consider issues not raised in the court below … including contentions
that restitution was awarded in error because it was not statutorily authorized”) (internal
citations omitted); but see, e.g., State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877, 908 P.2d 566, 570
(1995) (holding “a criminal defendant need not move for a directed verdict or judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in order to preserve for appeal the issue of whether there was
sufficient evidence before the jury to support a verdict to convict”).
Alternatively, even if this claim has been preserved, the proper remedy would not
be vacating the restitution order, as Ibarra requests. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.)
Rather, this Court should remand the claim to calculate restitution in light of Nelson and
Cunningham (which, at the time of sentencing, had only existed for one day).
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Ibarra claims that this case should not be remanded because the district court
“expressly told the State it needed to present evidence to support its restitution request
and the State still failed to meet its burden in that regard.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) She
analogizes to Nelson, where “the State had been afforded two opportunities to provide
sufficient evidence and failed to carry its burden,” and concludes that here too, “a second
bite at the proverbial apple would be improper.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15 (citing Nelson,
161 Idaho at 697, 390 P.3d at 423).)
But the proverbial apple was never on the menu below, much less bitten. Ibarra
waited until this appeal to challenge the restitution. The state had no opportunity to
address her arguments because she never made them below. This is unlike Nelson, where
the requested restitution was adjusted by the district court and ordered; appealed;
remanded; litigated at a restitution hearing, expressly objected to, and re-ordered; and
appealed again. 161 Idaho at 694, 390 P.3d at 420. By contrast, Ibarra made zero efforts
to challenge the order below, and should not receive the benefit of barring the state from
submitting additional evidence to address her belated evidentiary concerns. In the event
she prevails on this unpreserved claim, the proper remedy would be a remand. See also
Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702, 390 P.3d at 428.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Ibarra’s judgments of conviction
and affirm the restitution order.
DATED this 5th day of February, 2018.

/s/ Kale D. Gans__________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of February, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Kale D. Gans______________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
KDG/dd

32

